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1. Introduction. A number of authors, among them Oskar Becker, Marvin Farber, 
Suzanne Bachelard and Rosado Haddock, have sought to demonstrate the 
importance of mathematics in the development of Husserl's philosophy. Bachelard, 
in particular, has demonstrated the relevance to Husserl's thinking of Riemannian 
manifold theory and Oess adequately) of Brouwer's intuitionism .1 Rosado Haddock 
has attempted to set H usserl's philosophy of mathematics and logic within the 
perspective of contemporary research in foundations.2 The present monograph 
consists in a detailed exposition of the philosophical relevance of Husserl's own 
immediate mathematical background, concentrating upon the influence of 
Weierstrass, Kronecker, Cantor and Frege. 
Husserl.served for a time as the assistant of Weierstrass in Berlin, where he also 
attended lectures by Kronecker. He later came into contact with Cantor in Halle, and 
the principal thesis of Schmit's monograph is that much of Husserl's work in the 
philosophy of mathematics can be understood as a working out of the tension 
between what Schmit conceives as the platonism of Cantor and Weierstrass and the 
constructivism of Kronecker. 
For Kronecker, as is well known, only the positive whole numbers have an auton-
omous existence; all other (legitimate) mathematical objects are built up on the basis 
of these via mathematical operations. For Weierstrass, in contrast, 'all numbers have 
identical civil rights' in the domain of mathematical objects. Yet philosophical reflec-
tions involving the notion of a mathematical operation were by no means alien to 
Weierstrass, as notes of his lectures taken by Husserl reveal. Weierstrass was indeed 
prepared to talk of the operation of Zusammenfassung (bringing together) in 
mathematics as a psychological act-and a similar notion is of course present also in 
the writings of Cantor. One of Husserl's principal tasks in his early writings was to 
determine the extent to which such talk of operations (whether psychological or not) 
can do justice to those of our intuitions on the status of mathematical truths which 
derive from a broadly platonistic standpoint. Mere reference to operations cannot, it 
is clear, serve to characterise a philosophy of mathematics as con~tructivist . But there 
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are two further characteristic moments of constructivism: nominalism and finitism, 
both neatly represented in Kronecker's work. Whilst nominalistic traits were always 
alien to Husserl, Kronecker's finitism, as Schmit shows, played a significant role 
throughout Husserl's philosophy of mathematics. 
Schmit moves chronologically through the various stages in the development of 
Husserl's thought on mathematics. Chapter One is devoted to the Philosophie der 
Arithmetik (PdA) of 1891, concentrating upon the interplay of constructivism and 
psychologism in this work. The discussion of constructivism is admirable: Schmit 
provides a clear account of the role of symbolisation in the construction of number 
(and of the way in which symbols may, at one and the same time, both construct and 
signify higher mathematical entities), and of the doctrines underlying Husserl's rejec-
tion of the actual infinite. Schmit's treatment of Husser's purported psychologism is 
however less satisfactory, as we shall see below. 
The discussion of the actual infinite is carried further in Chapter Two of the 
work, devoted to Husserl's encounter with Cantor. Chapter Three moves on to deal 
with Husserl's masterpiece, the Logische Untrsuchungen (LU) of 1900/01, and 
specifically the 'Prolegomena to pure logic' (Vol. 1 of the German edition), whose 
extreme, anti-psychologistic platonism Schmit describes- correctly-as a mere 
'transitory phase' in Husserl's thinking. Wi.th Chapter Four. on Husserl's theory of 
the definite manifold (complete model), we return to the influence of Cantor, whose 
discovery of the Burali - Forti paradox in about 1895 had awakened in Husserl a first 
awareness of the problems nowadays associated with the completeness and consist-
ency of a formal theory. Schmit sets forth here also the influence of Hilbert, and the 
implications for Husserl's theory of Godel's results. Chapter Five on 'The idea of 
pure logic', dealing with Husserl's notion of a formal theory, completes the discus-
sion of the LU, and Chapter Six is devoted to the conception of mathematics presup-
posed in the Formate und transzendentale Logik. 
In Chapter Seven Schmit returns to the general issue of constructivism versus 
p latonism. Husserl, Schmit concludes, has managed to free himself of the platonism 
which he had embraced in the 'Prolegomena' ot the LU, by conceiving mathematics 
as a 'realm of universal construction'. Iterative construction, which generates ever 
new formations is-in contrast to platonistic concept-formations-directed always 
to the effective givenness of the objects of mathematic (p.136). 
The volume closes with a brief epilogue on Husserl's 'transcendental phenomen-
o logy'. It contains an excellent bibliography, but lacks an index, a serious inadequacy 
in a volume in which so much disparate material, both mathematical and philosoph-
ical and from both the phenomenological and the analytic literature, is discussed. 
Schmit 's monograph is undoubtedly the best and most well-researched treatment 
of H usserl's philosophy of mathematics that has appeared to date, and there are 
many aspects of his account which would merit detailed consideration. Here, how-
ever, I shall have space to deal only with the much vexed question of Husserl's 
purported psychologism in the PdA, and with his notion of a formal theory as devel-
oped in the LU. 
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2. On psycho/ogism. A number, according to Husserl in the PdA , is the answer to a 
how many question posed in relation to a given plurality. A number is a property of a 
plurality. The philosophy of number must begin, therefore, with an understanding of 
the concept of plurality, and this presupposes in turn that we have an understanding 
of what it is which binds together the items in a plurality in virtue of which that 
plurality can be said to exist at all. 
Because of the unrestricted generality of the concept of number (of what can be 
subjected to a count), the relation which these items bear to each other cannot be any 
real, physical or material relation, for example of proximity or of similarity. And nor 
can it be a relation which the items bear to each other in virtue of falling under a 
single concept-at least if the term 'concept' is understood in the traditional manner 
as signifying that which is connoted by a general term such as 'mammal' or 'human 
being'. For the objects in a plurality must not merely be picked out by means of some 
concept word (count noun), they must also be delimited in some way, for example as 
falling within a certain geographical area, and then the relevant delimitation would 
seem to be a component of the actually executed act of counting. Husserl concludes, 
in fact, that it is a mental or psychical relation, a relation constituted in or with the act 
of counting, which binds together the items in a pluality. Such a relation is entirely 
spurious or, more precisely, entirely extraneous, having no foundation in the mater-
ial make-up of its relata. We have, according to Husserl, a 'spontaneous power of 
colligation ', and the relation between objects thus colligated 'resides exclusively in 
the unifying act itself' (PdA: Husserliana, vol. 12, 43). It is this which explains the 
complete generality of the process of counting, and thereby also the complete gener-
ality of the concept of number. 
But how can this appeal to spontaneous operations of consciousness be made 
consistent with those propositions about number which have their origins in a 
broadly platonist standpoint? How, above all, is this approach in terms of actually 
executed acts and operations to be made consistent with the fact that the propositions 
of arithmetic are necessary truths? Husserl, it must be admitted, gives no entirely 
satisfactory answers to these questions in the PdA, and Frege was able to point to 
certain passages in the work which suggested that he had indeed adopted a psycholo-
gistic standpoint on the issues involved-Le. that he had sacrificed the necessity of 
propositions about number in order to uphold his theory of numbers as properties of 
psychologically generated pluralities. 
A careful reading of the text would, however, have revealed to Frege that the 
work avoids such crude psychologism by distinguishing two quite different sorts of 
question: those relating to the origins and role of the concept of number in our mental 
experience, and those relating to the content (or ideal significance) of this concept 
itself. It is only in relation to the former that the properties of actually executed, 
empirically existing mental acts are of relevance. The necessity of arithmetical truths 
is guaranteed entirely by the latter. Husserl can justifiably be accused of a variant 
form of psychologism, but only in the attenuated sense that he assumed that the eluci-
dation of the content of the concept of number must presuppose or at least involve 
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some elucidation of the origin and role of this concept in our mental life. Completely 
to renounce psychologism of this residual variety is however to run the risk of abandon; 
ing any attempt to understand how the necessary truths of arithmetic (or, equally, of 
logic) can come to play a role in our actual thinking. But this, Husserl would argue, is 
precisely one of the most significant problems in the philosophy of mathematics. 
The principal inadequacies in the PdA lie in fact not in any crude psychologism, 
but in certain terminological inadequacies on Husserl's part. Of these the most 
important derives from the fact that Husserl had inherited from his teacher Brentano 
a dualism which divided all phenomena (everything that is given in experience) into 
two categories of 'psychical and physical phenomena' . Experience itself is corres-
pondingly divided into 'inner and outer perception', according as to whether what is 
experienced is a psychical phenomenon (a part or moment of one's own mental 
experience, in particular a mental act), or a physical phenomenon (something given 
as external or transcendent to consciousness, for example an experienced colour-
datum). Constrained by this dualistic framework Husserl was initially compelled to 
consign to the realm of the psychical everything non-physical, i.e. everything not 
founded in the material make-up of given objects. Identity, for example, he was 
constrained to describe as a psychical relation, and so also in the case of the (empty, 
extraneous) relation which links the items in a plurality. But then 'psychical' comes to 
signify nothing other than 'not real', 'not founded in any material peculiarities of the 
things themselves', and it was so used by Husserl-albeit falteringly-until the 
terminology of 'psychical' and 'physical' was replaced, in his later writings, by the 
much more straightforward and consistently applicable terminology of 'formal' and 
'material'. This in turn reflected Husserl's rapid progress, in the last decade of the 
19th century, in the understanding of the peculiarity of formal concepts and of the 
fundamental importance of the discipline of formal ontology. 
Schmit, unfortunately, ignores this line of development in Husserl's thought, and 
indeed he makes no reference to the influence of Brentano. In this respect Schmit 
reveals himself to be rooted in the post-War German tradition of Husserl scholar-
ship, where the immediate philosophical influences upon the early Husserl, deriving 
largely from psychological and ontological writings of the Brentano school, have ten-
ded to be ignored in favour of an epistemologised account of his philosophy devel-
oped within the perspective of his later 'transcendental-phenomenological' writings. 
3. On the notion of a formal theory. The predominance of this same, epistemo-
logical, perspective may explain also the brevity of Schmit's treatment (pp.87 - 99) of 
the theory of formal ontology developed by Husserl in the LU. Husserl develops 
there a two-fold distinction between the formal and the material on the one hand, and 
between formal (apophantic) logic and formal ontology on the other. The first 
distinction lies at the root of Husserl's account of the applicability of mathematics 
(and of formal theories in general): application is identified with materialisation, 
that is to say with the substitution of material terms of a greater or lesser generality 
for purely empty formal terms-terms ranging over all material regions without 
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restriction-in the propositions of a formal theory. The second distinction may be 
explained as follows. 
Each and every formal theory, each and every theoretically complete and consjst-
ent system of proposition-forms (propositions containing no material terms) deter-
mines, or corresponds ideally to, an appropriate domain of object-forms. Formal 
logic is the discipline which has as its subject-matter the pure forms of propositions 
('apophanses ')and of meaning-entities in general, and which concerns itself specific-
ally with the logical (deducibility) relations amongst these meaning-forms. Formal 
ontology is the discipline which has as its subject-matter the pure forms of object-
entities in- general: forms such as thing, state of affairs, unity, plurality, number, 
relation, connection, etc. (LU, 'Prolegomena', §67). The sub-disciplines of formal 
ontology would therefore include, for example, number theory, set theory, topology, 
measure theory, and certain other branches of mathematics. But they would include 
also the theory of parts and wholes, embracing not only the theory of extensive part-
whole relations (i .e. Lesniewskian mereology), the theory of the relations amongst 
wholes and their various detachable 'pieces', but also the theory of non-extensive 
part-whole relations amongst wholes and their non-detachable 'moments' (and 
amongst the pieces of such moments) developed by Husserl in the 3rd Logical Investi-
gation. (Schmit, unfortunately, seems to confuse the two kinds of theory: see p.94/.) 
Whilst the extensive fragment of the formal ontological theory of part-whole rela-
tions is, mathematically speaking, almost completely trivial, ·the full theory of part-
whole relations has a much more interesting structure (illuminated by Kit Fine, in as 
yet unpublished writings, from the standpoint of algebraic topology). And the appar-
ent mathematical fruitfulness and wide applicability of this full theory, in association 
with the other formal ontological disciplines, lends substance to Husserl's 
enthusiastic claims, advanced not only in the LU but also in his later works, to the 
effect that it would be possible to develop an absolutely general formal mathesis 
universalis, a single theory within which the various branches of mathematics would 
find their (natural) place. And whilst some of Husserl's own explicit statements on 
the structure of this mathesis universalis have been shown, as a result of Godel's 
theorems, to be ill-founded, the fundamental idea of such a theory-and specifically 
the idea of a rigorous working out of the strictly mathematical implications of the 
general theory of pan and whole-continues to hold out much promise. 
But now Schmit's identification of Husserlian philosophy of mathematics with 
the theory of mathematical constructions appears, in this light, to require supplemen-
tation: not by any element of platonism- the ever-present but ultimately irrelevant 
bugbear of Schmit's account-but by a conception of mathematics formulated 
within the framework of Husserl's idea of a formal mathesis universalis. 
